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 Abstract 
 
 In this paper we describe some counter-psychological approaches to 
psychological terms such as ‘thinking’, ‘understanding’, ‘intending’ and so on. 
We draw on the work of Coulter, Ryle, Sacks and Wittgenstein in order to do 
this and, initially, to sketch out some general convergences between 
pragmatics, conversation analysis and discursive psychology. From here we go 
on to rehearse two analyses by Harvey Sacks; the first focusing on a single 
utterance (“I just had a thought”) and the second on a more extensive case of 
“inference making”. Because this leads us to doubt the often-assumed view 
that psychological terms have meaning by referring to mental states, we end 
with the question of ordinary, everyday practices of ‘referring to mental states’ 
— an issue marking a potential difference between some Wittgensteinian 
scholars and discursive psychology. 
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 What can psychological terms actually do? 
(Or: if Sigmund calls, tell him it didn’t work) 
 
There’s a place in Freud where he says, “with regard to matters 
of chemistry or physics or things like that, laymen would not 
venture an opinion. With regard to psychology it’s quite 
different; anybody feels free to make psychological remarks”. 
And part of the business he thought he was engaged in was 
changing that around, i.e., to both develop psychology and 
educate laymen, co-jointly. So that laymen would know that 
they don’t know anything about it and that there are people 
who do, so that they would eventually stop making 
psychological remarks as they stopped making chemical and 
physical remarks. 
Harvey Sacks (1992b: 217) 
 
 
Whereas the general public may or may not have given up physical and 
chemical remarks as a bad job, sadly enough perhaps for professional 
psychology, laypersons have continued to use supposedly proprietary terms 
such as ‘think’, ‘understand’, ‘intend’, and the rest. And little wonder, given 
that intensional expressions of this kind have been perfectly ordinary and 
useful ways of talking about ourselves since long before the advent of the “psy-
complex” (Rose, 1990). But what pragmatic status do these psychological terms 
have? Harvey Sacks gives us a further clue as to how to go about answering 
this question when he says: 
People have the conception that psychological terms are properly used 
by virtue of special knowledge of the persons you’re dealing with. (And 
by “psychological terms” I mean conventional, lay sets of terms like 
‘thinking’, ‘having a reason for doing something’, etc.) Now that’s a 
kind of thing that people who have had some university training are 
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specially wont to insist on, i.e., “You don’t really know about somebody 
until you ... etc”. But our language is not built in such a way. Persons use 
psychological terms with the same freedom and ‘lack of knowledge of 
other persons’ as they do any other terms (1992a: 558; our emphasis). 
So where we might begin is by suspecting that (pace most of mainstream 
psychology) psychological terms, lay or indeed professional, may have no 
special status from a pragmatic point of view.i That is, they may offer no 
special insight into the internal workings of the psyche, let alone the brain or 
CNS. Rather they could be argued to be doing something quite different and 
distinct from this. What could this be? Jeff Coulter’s work on this question 
takes us a step further. 
 Coulter (1979) has argued, following Ryle (1949), that there must be a 
logical grammar — a consistent and repeatably discoverable pragmatic 
analysis — of mental predicate ascriptions and avowals, particularly with 
respect to such terms as ‘understand’, ‘think’, ‘intend’, ‘believe’, ‘feel’, etc. 
Without such a logical grammar, the main alternative would be to assume that 
these terms have meaning by mapping directly on to internal states or 
processes. But, deeply embedded as it may be in certain versions of psychology 
and ‘educated’ common sense, that assumption has at least one troublesome 
consequence. Coulter describes this via a Wittgensteinian parable: 
Imagine a community in which each member had a box with something 
inside it. Everyone calls the object in the box a ‘beetle’, but no one can 
look in anyone else’s box and can only determine the nature of ‘beetle’ 
by looking into his own box. Wittgenstein proposes that, if ‘beetle’ has a 
use in the public language, then the object in the box must be irrelevant 
to its meaning. If this private object does play a part in the understanding 
of ‘beetle’, then intersubjective communication would be impossible 
(1979: 78). 
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As Wittgenstein puts it, “The thing in the box has no place in the language-
game at all”; so the grammar of psychological terms cannot be construed “on 
the model of ‘object and designation’” (1958: §293). The argument is not, then, 
that there are no mental states, for that would buy us into a radical 
behaviourism (see Button, et al., 1995: 58-75). Rather, the actual use of 
psychological terms (again, lay or professional) cannot, after Wittgenstein, 
Ryle, Sacks and Coulter, be taken to be merely referential (cf. O’Brien-Malone 
and Antaki, 2002). For example, Coulter argues that ‘understand’ can be (and 
perhaps most often is) used as a “terminus verb” (1979: 37) — ‘I understand 
(period)’ routinely being used to close specific topics, as opposed, for example, 
to standing as a mere verbal (external) proxy for (internal) ‘cognitive closure’. 
 In line with such arguments, discursive psychologists have begun to show 
that — as and where psychology may be interested in such things as memory 
(Edwards, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992), identity (Antaki, et al., 1996) or 
attitudes (Wetherell and Potter, 1992) — it makes no sense to take these terms 
merely as substantives mapping referentially (and sometimes universally) on 
to internal cognitive phenomena. As we have seen, such a bedrock assumption 
is not only mistaken, it may also contradict the very possibility of public 
communication. Even if the “thing in the box” exists in some form or other, it 
can play no part in the language-game. Instead, then, working with a much less 
problematic assumption — that public communication is possible — discursive 
psychologists have begun to examine (as the analysis of memory, identity and 
attitudes, inter alia, as such) how these matters arise pragmatically in everyday 
talk and texts. 
 Take for example what might be construed as an instance of a claim to an 
absence of knowledge, a claim not to have a thought, examined by discursive 
psychologists Edwards and Potter (in press). In the extract below, Jimmy is 
describing, in a couple-counselling session, a difficult evening in the pub with 
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his wife, Connie, and another man, Dave.  
1 J: And uh:: (1.0) Connie had a short skirt on  
   → 2  I don’ know 
3  (1.0) 
4  And I knew this– (0.6) uh ah– maybe I had 
5  met him. 
6  (1.0) 
7  Ye:h. (.) I musta met Da:ve before. 
Here Jimmy frames his upcoming account of Connie’s “flirtatious” behaviour 
during the evening with the detail that she was wearing a “short” skirt. This 
specific aspect of Connie’s clothing is immediately followed by what is, on the 
face of it, apparently a claim to a particular psychological state: “I don’ know”. 
Edwards and Potter point out that: 
It would be a mistake to hear this as simply an assertion of ignorance or 
uncertainty, or even as an ‘assertion’ at all (it is said parenthetically, 
with no explicit object). What it does, like the rest of the sequence in 
which it occurs, is attend to Jimmy’s own character, as a purportedly 
jealous and suspicious husband who may be prone (in this case) to some 
kind of obsessive monitoring of the details of his wife’s clothing and 
behaviour. The use here, and just here, of “I don’ know” counters that. It 
implies that he wasn’t paying particular attention, and does not have a 
lot hanging on it. In fact this kind of interpersonal use of “I don’ know” 
or “I dunno” (used in this parenthetical, framing kind of way, rather 
than as a bald answer to a factual question), recurs across a range of 
discourse materials as a way of handling, or playing down, the speaker’s 
stake or interest in the content of a description (Edwards and Potter, in 
press: np). 
Our initial question, then, is clearly on the current and convergent agendas of 
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pragmatics, conversation analysis and discursive psychology: so, again, what 
can psychological terms actually do? 
 To be sure, Wittgenstein (1958; 1974), with his emphasis on actual use as 
opposed to referential meaning, gives us an initial philosophical impetus 
against assuming that utterances like “I know...” or “I don’t know…” 
necessarily tell us something about knowledge as such. And Coulter, via his 
consideration of actual uses of ‘believe’, ‘understand’ and so on, carries this 
forward into areas of pragmatic interest. In addition, the discursive 
psychologists are beginning to show that the pragmatic analysis of 
psychological terms in actual talk and texts has important consequences for 
mainstream psychology’s interests. From here, we want to try to ground these 
insights in further perspicuous and suitably illustrative cases of psychological 
terms doing things of overt and direct pragmatic consequence as opposed to 
referring, abstractly, to mental states. 
 
 
 
Our next case, from Sacks (1970), involves “having a thought” — surely a 
matter of central psychological interest if ever there was one — along with 
some closely related kinds of utterances. Sacks, at this point in his work, is 
interested in how speakers may get to be able to do a multi-clause or multi-
sentence turn at talk — what conversation analysts would now call talking 
beyond more than a single transition-relevance place (TRP) — and have it 
heard, right off, that that’s how their turn is designed, such that, at the first 
TRP, someone else does not begin to speak. He introduces his data fragment 
with the following observation: “[T]here are ‘on topic’ topic markers, and they 
are routinely used where it may be that the utterance they are part of is both 
extended and more than a possible complete sentence, and where also it might 
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from its beginning otherwise not seem on topic” (1970: 45). So there is a general 
problem for speakers when they want to talk to topic but, at first blush, their 
projected talk may not seem to be so relevant.ii And one way they can do this is 
to use an “on topic” topic marker which signals both upcoming multiple TRPs 
and the upcoming topicality of their turn. Sacks (1970: 45) then cites the 
following fragment: 
 → A: Um I just had a thought. I know someone who um uh 
   has two smaller children, and uh would like, I think 
   to get in some– just some weekends you know, but 
   whether um she could do it regularly or not — 
  B: Well– 
  A: I think I’ll talk to her. 
 The crucial utterance-part here is: “I just had a thought”. Can analysts or 
members hear this part as anything like a reference to an internal state or 
process on A’s part? Whereas cognitive psychology would no doubt be 
tempted to seize upon “I just had a thought” as evidence of an internal state, in 
this instance it manifestly is not. And it is not, because, for one thing, “I just had 
a thought” (although it can complete a turn-constructional unit) occurs here in 
an unlikely sequential position for an interlocutor to take a turn directly 
addressing the (then) previous speaker’s mental state. That is — Beckett and 
Pinter notwithstanding — we don’t routinely get such things as: 
 * A: I just had a thought. 
  B: Tell me about your thought processes? 
Sacks gives us the following contextual information on the actual fragment, 
and this brings us a little closer to what, instead, “I just had a thought” is 
actually doing in this place: 
In the conversation from which this fragment is taken, A has been 
engaged in offering and attempting to convince B to take a nursing job. 
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B has refused, in part because she doesn’t want a seven day a week job 
which the job would be, were she unable to get someone to surely take 
over on weekends (1970: 45). 
Accordingly, “I know someone who has two smaller children...” could not quite 
start the turn in question. Its topicality would be, without the “on topic” topic 
marker (“I just had a thought”), at least somewhat opaque with respect to its 
topicality. Sacks puts this, elegantly as ever, as follows (and we quote, 
necessarily, at length): 
Now it seems on the one hand that the first sentence of A’s utterance is 
an instance of what is generally used as an “on topic” topic marker, and 
that her otherwise first sentence, or the sentence that follows it, might, 
lacking the marker that precedes, be either some sort of possibly 
complete utterance, and be one whose topical status is not apparent. It is 
only by virtue of what is thereafter said that the way the utterance is in 
point is made apparent. I do not mean to suggest that the utterance, 
were it to have gone: “I know someone who um uh has two smaller children” 
possible period, would be heard as utterly puzzling, but, e.g., that such 
an utterance or such a begun utterance might have a range of topical 
interpretations which would allow for seeing it as complete then, e.g., it 
might be heard as complete and the recipient might hear it in such a 
way as to say to herself “Well, maybe she’d be interested” or, “And does 
she have the same problem as I?”, for example. I do mean to suggest 
that with the use of an “on topic” topic marker a recipient can be 
informed that he is to wait out the particular sort of on-topicness that 
the forthcoming talk will have, and thereby may find the sort of on-
topicness that the speaker intends for it to have (1970: 45-46). 
To put our argument concisely then: what “I just had a thought” is actually 
doing here is clearly not making a reference to a mental state or process — whether or 
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not, concurrently with its utterance, or just prior to it, A. actually experienced a 
mental event glossable as “I know someone who has two smaller children”.iii It 
does not ‘refer’ to an immaterial state or process concurrent with it or preceding 
it; rather it works in the talk to prefigure some talk yet to come. It looks forward 
to a quite public, social and material thing rather than backward to a putatively 
private event ‘in the head’. We are reminded of a comparable remark of 
Wittgenstein’s — that “the language game of reporting can be given such a 
turn that a report is not meant to inform the hearer about its subject matter but 
about the person making the report” (Wittgenstein, 1958, IIx, our emphasis) — in 
this case of course the informing accomplished by “I just had a thought” is not 
that the speaker has been suddenly assailed by an announceable cognitive 
happening, but rather that they are an attentive interlocutor who is on-topic 
and whose turn is not, despite possible first appearances, to be taken as a 
accountable non-sequitur. 
 Here it might be objected, for example by strong cognitivists, that questions 
of what people, as it were, actually wonder, remember and think have been left 
behind in favour of a glance at some merely ‘trivial’ fragment of conversation. 
To such an objection — often called in ethnomethodological circles the ‘so 
what’ question — Sacks has a fairly definitive answer: the fragment is not just a 
fragment; rather it is an instance of a large class (or “population”) of material 
social practices that are critical for the production of social order in the first place 
— and prior to any analytic interest in them: 
It seems that “I just had a thought” is not merely an “on topic” topic 
marker by convention. Instead, since topical organization serves as a 
basic means for the locating of things to be said ... it happens that the 
thoughts, remembrances, wonderings and the like that persons engaged 
in topical talk have will routinely be on topic, and then that they do 
exhibit that they are operating, absorbed in the talk, by presenting their 
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talk with such specific “on topic” topic markers as “I just wondered”, “I 
just remembered”, “I just had a thought”, and the like (1970: 46). 
That is, we don’t just have wonderings, memories, thoughts, and the rest in 
some department of internal affairs; and we don’t just say we have them at any 
old points in the talk; we routinely talk of them in ways that turn out to be 
topical, and in ways that get recognised by others for the topicality of that talk. 
(Of course both Wittgenstein and Coulter rightly insist that the ratifiability 
criteria for claims to private ‘internal events’ such as ‘having a memory’ and 
‘understanding’ are overwhelmingly public.) And this doesn’t simply apply to 
fragments like “I just had a thought”, it applies to a class or “population” of 
such things, as Sacks makes clear in his final remark on the matter: 
Note in this regard that the question of the status of each item as “on 
topic” topic marker may gain some support through the manifestly, or 
seemingly close relation, between such usages as “I just had a thought” 
and e.g., “It just occurred to me” and in that regard we can use as the 
distributional population not merely the one, but a range of similar 
seeming objects for finding the work that they commonly do (1970: 47-48; 
our emphasis). 
And this is characteristic of Sacks: the search for a “population” of expressions 
(in this case a population involving intensional expressions) in terms of the 
work they commonly do, rather than in terms of, for example, their putative 
referential function as mental state descriptors.iv 
 To put this another way, unlike standard psychological accounts (even soi-
disant ‘social’ psychological accounts) in which an individual, person or mind is 
inspected (on the basis of ‘its’ utterances) for how it has its own specific 
attitudes or memories or makes, for example, its own inferences or predictions, 
Sacks refers instead to “the way that society goes about building people” 
(1992a: 117), pretty much regardless of individual differences within the 
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society. Hence, at the close of his first published lecture, he announces what we 
might call the ‘basic Sacks injunction’: 
First of all, don’t worry about whether [participants are] ‘thinking’, Just 
try to come to terms with how it is that the thing comes off. Because 
you’ll find that they can do these things [that is, act with remarkable 
immediacy such that “they couldn’t have thought that fast”]. Just take 
any other area of natural science and see, for example, how fast 
molecules do things. And they don’t have very good brains. So just let 
the materials fall as they may. Look to see how it is that persons go 
about producing what they do produce (1992a: 11).v 
We can see the problematic upshot of this for psychological realism generally if 
we look at another “way that society goes about building people” also 
analysed by Sacks, but this time from an early lecture. 
 
 
 
In this lecture originally from 1965 (1992a: 113-125; cf. Sacks, 1985), Sacks turns 
to the question of inference making; again a topic close to mainstream 
psychology’s heartland. But rather than turn to individual capacities for 
inference making, Sacks refers instead to a general social machinery (an 
“inference-making machine”) available to any person who happens to be built 
by a society that includes such a device. Sacks refers to the following data 
(1992a: 113):vi 
(1) A: Yeah, then what happened? 
(2) B: Okay, in the meantime she [wife of B] says, “Don’t ask the child 
nothing”. Well, she stepped between me and the child and I got up to 
walk out the door. When she stepped between me and the child, I went 
to move her out of the way. And then about that time her sister called the 
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police. I don’t know how she ... what she ... 
→ (3) A: Didn’t you smack her one? 
(4) B: No. 
(5) A: You’re not telling me the story, Mr B. 
(6) B: Well, you see when you say smack you mean hit. 
→ (7) A: Yeah, you shoved her. Is that it? 
(8) B: Yeah, I shoved her. 
Sacks suggests this exchange works because inferences can go backwards from 
member-categorial explanations (that it was “her sister” that called the police) 
to describe events (that B. “smacked her” or “shoved her”). To see the 
importance of this, we need to briefly summarise a general finding of 
membership categorisation analysis (MCA). 
 In MCA, we often see cases like the following: a category of actions is held, 
by members, to obtain for a general category of persons in the society; so if an 
activity takes place but the actor is not known, the actor can be inferred from the 
‘types of persons who do that’. For example, if it’s known that an arrest has 
taken place, we have instant candidates for who (as a type) might have done the 
arresting and who (again, as a type) might have been the one arrested. The 
reverse also holds: knowing the type that a particular person is, we can infer the 
kinds of actions they are likely to engage in. In the materials just cited, however, 
the categorial action is relatively more specific: something like ‘the types of 
activities that lead to the police being called’. If there is (a) an argument between 
spouses + (b) an unknown action + (c) a call to the police, we can reasonably 
infer that (b) is an action warranting (c). Given, then, that the wife’s sister makes 
the call (and not, say, a passer-by in the street or one of the neighbours) it is 
likely the husband has been in some way violent towards the wife. The 
inference-making machine then runs through possible actions of this type and, 
as it turns out, reaches the correct action on second try: he shoved her. (Note: 
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this is a necessarily truncated summary and the whole of Sacks’s analysis 
should be consulted for the fine-grained detail.) 
 The upshot is that while categories of person-in-general are relevant to the 
mundane inference (husband, wife, wife’s sister, child, and police) no particular 
person’s psychological state, interiority or mental capacity must be 
comprehended in order for the correct inference to be drawn. As Sacks puts it: 
[I]t is an awesome machine if one needs to know only that it is “my wife” 
and “her sister”. And you can do this because that holds for every like unit 
in society, such that you don’t need to ask for example, “Well tell me 
some more about your wife’s sister, is she elderly? Is she prone to 
hysterics?” which is something that would be absolutely essential in 
psychology (1992a: 117; our emphases). 
By contrast with Sacks’s basic injunction — indeed, by contrast with his overall 
conception of social science as describing the way society builds people — then, 
psychology works in the following way: it can turn routine inferences based on 
categories of person (like the one above) into questions about the personal 
characteristics of the individual or individuals involved — questions that are 
redundant to the inference as such. It can then ‘explain’ the inference, qua 
ordinary everyday categorial procedure, in terms of its (psychology’s) 
supposedly (extraordinary) assessment of an individual’s, for example, ‘mental 
capacities’ (see Rapley et al., in press). 
 Although psy-professionals rarely make such procedures explicit — indeed, 
to do so might raise questions about their claim to special expertise — in pop 
psychology the process can be more overt. For example, it can turn ordinary 
inference into something apparently more extraordinary and (pseudo-) 
mysterious: intuition: 
As a teenager I could always tell when my parents were due home from 
work. Minutes before their arrival our family cat sat expectantly at the 
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window above the driveway. Animals often have a finely-tuned sense of 
perception (Osfield, 1997: 58). 
The ordinary inference is visible: working parents return from work at more-or-
less regular times; if they have animals, that is when the animals get food and 
affection; and animals are not without a trained sense of the regular timing of 
food and affection. Ergo, the cat waits for the sound of the returning car. A 
perfectly ordinary inference for the teenage Osfield, then, until ‘intuition’ is 
added to the account as a supernumerary feature of the event (albeit, in this 
case, as a quality of her particular cat or, indeed, of cats in general). Then, 
transferring back from the cat to persons, the ‘analyst’ can add ‘expert’ 
testimony: 
“Unfortunately, rational society tends to trust only what people can see, 
hear, taste, touch, smell. We tend to disregard our sixth sense and rely 
completely on our thinking minds”, says Simon Turnball, President of 
the Australian Psychic Association. “Most people live disconnected from 
their intuition until it fights its way out from the subconscious” (Osfield, 
1997: 58). 
So, on this account, some individuals appear to be built with a unique (animal-
like?) pre-social inner capacity that resides in the “subconscious” and is a 
psychic corollary of the (five?) bodily senses. Almost anything that is explicable 
by normal inference or is generated by probability (such as getting a call from 
someone you were just thinking of) can then have ‘intuition’ superadded to it. 
But at the same time, the superadding process (which may, in some 
circumstances, be a kind of analytic dishonesty) is, itself, actually quite 
ordinary, if not utterly commonsensical: 
What is intuition? 
Intuition is not as mysterious as you might think. It mixes life experience 
with commonsense and a willingness to tune in and find out what you 
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are feeling about something, as well as thinking. It’s a good idea to try 
out your intuition on relatively trivial matters before using it to make 
big decisions (Osfield, 1997: 61). 
 The pop-psychological case is, no doubt, both extreme and terribly 
confused; but it does illustrate the danger (in professional analysis, in ‘psychic’ 
explanations, or in popular-magazine accounts) of taking apparent mental-
state terms as corresponding to reified psychological conditions or capacities. 
Indeed, Sacks, shortly following the analysis of the transcript in question, 
shows how highly professional (non-pop) clinical assessments can ‘run’ the 
inference machine and use familiarity with its workings (or its thereby 
noticeable failings to work) on specific occasions of clinical diagnosis: 
If you read Cleckley’s book The Mask of Sanity [1955], the psychopathic 
personality is reported to be that person who, at any given point in their 
behavior, you never know what’s going to happen next. You’re never 
able to say “Here is an nth point in this sequence, and now X, Y, and Z 
will come”. And they are taken to be about as painful a person as you 
can have around (1992a: 119). 
Immediately following this, Sacks goes on to neatly summarise his position 
and to explicate the very particular kind of ‘behaviourism’ it entails: 
Now, what I have been proposing could be restated as follows: For 
Members, activities are observables. They see activities. They see 
persons doing intimacy, they see persons lying, etc.... And that poses for 
us the task of being behaviorists in this sense: Finding how it is that 
people can produce sets of actions that provide that others can see such 
things (1992: 119). 
Again, contrast this so-called behaviourism with the standard account and with 
the Ryle-Wittgenstein position (Button et al., 1995: 35 and 58-75).  Returning 
to the transcript: no doubt A. acts with remarkable speed in getting from a set 
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of events E1, E2 ... E4 to inferring a particular E3 that must have intervened and 
which must, given E1 and E2, have provided grounds for E4 occurring. But, 
with Sacks, we need attribute no specific inner capacity to that inferential work 
(and/or its alacrity) on her part. To say that she inferred something (here, that 
the husband was violent) is to describe what she did in the course of her talk, as 
what anyone could do in such a course of talk. It is not to make guesses about, 
for example, her inner psychological state: such guesses about putative inner 
states and processes are, of course, the sort of officially sanctioned superadding 
that we now rely on professional psychology to supply. As ever Wittgenstein 
clearly points to the substantive issue here. He asks “how does the 
philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviourism arise? — The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. 
We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime 
perhaps we shall know more about them — we think. But that is just what 
commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter” (Wittgenstein, 1958: 
§308). In line with this, the basic Sacks injunction points us towards inference 
(and other supposedly ‘psychological’ processes) as routine culture-wide and 
visible practices rather than as instances or outcomes of, for example, hidden 
cognitive activities only available to recondite expert analysis. 
 
 
 
Are we saying, then, that wherever and whenever psychological terms crop up 
in ordinary everyday settings — or indeed, by extension, in professional 
analytic settings — they always and necessarily must be doing something other 
than reference to private, mental objects? The strong Wittgenstein-Ryle-Coulter 
thesis has already suggested as much. To rehearse the point: “Wittgenstein 
proposes that, if ‘beetle’ has a use in the public language, then the object in the 
Ψ terms / page 16 
box must be irrelevant to its meaning. If this private object does play a part in 
the understanding of ‘beetle’, then intersubjective communication would be 
impossible” (Coulter, 1979: 78). Sacks, at least on our reading, and given our 
selections, appears to come close to such a view. The public machinery for 
building social persons, at least, is always held to be what is actually ‘running’ 
when folk say such things as “I just had a thought”, when inferences are made 
instantaneously in phone conversations, when pop-psych merchants discover 
mysterious ‘intuitions’, or when clinicians describe the psychopathic 
personality (cf. Sacks, 1992a: 72-80; esp. 80). 
 So is it impossible, as it were, in the actual mechanics of talk (as described 
by conversation analysis and Wittgenstein-inspired ethnomethodology), for 
members to do something like ‘referring to mental states’ — or would 
members, if they thought they were doing so, be just plain wrong about 
themselves?vii Put another way, would it be possible to apply the last two parts 
of the basic Sacks injunction — “... just let the materials fall as they may. Look 
to see how it is that persons go about producing what they do produce” (1992a: 
11) — to the production of a putative ordinary activity called ‘referring to 
mental states’? 
 It is clearly the case — in the claims to the presence or absence of thoughts 
and knowledge that we have seen so far — that it is impossible to sustain the 
claim that these utterances index mental events in the manner which 
mainstream psychology would have it. But what are we to make of an actual, 
rather than hypothetical, exchange such as that below reported by Leudar and 
Thomas (2000) in their analysis of descriptions of ‘hearing voices’ — surely a 
paradigmatic ‘inner’ ‘mental’ experience if ever there was one. It would seem 
that KL (in the transcript) reports, unequivocally, that he hears voices ‘in his 
head’; as opposed to ‘in his office’, ‘in the street’, or in any of the many other 
possible locations where such experiences can be said, in a grammatically 
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correct fashion, to be had. 
RS: […] OK that’s fine (.) um (..) OK (.) um would you (.) do you  
  see differences between the voice and yourself? 
KL: yeah 
RS: like what? 
KL: I am real (.) but the voice isn’t real 
RS: right (.) OK (.) and how do you know it’s not real (.) how 
  do  you identify it as not being real? 
→ KL because it’s in my head and no one else can hear it 
  (Leudar and Thomas, 2000: 202) 
 
 If one adopts a strict Coulterian position, it is difficult to avoid the 
proposition here that KL is either just plain wrong, or that he is mistaken about 
the experience he claims. Alternatively, it might be suggested that KL is 
engaged in some subtle recipient design work. After all, people who report 
hearing voices routinely attract the ascription of schizophrenia in consequence. 
As such, KL’s display here of his utterly routine mundane reality-testing 
procedures, and a relentlessly logical (ergo, non-‘insane’) approach to the 
establishment of what is and what is not really ‘real’ may be read as an instance 
of ‘doing being normal’, of countering any possible ascription of insanity to 
him.  
 Another approach to such reportings is, however, possible. One might 
assume, perhaps, that it would be an error to ironise KL’s description of this 
‘mental’ experience — inasmuch as we are ordinarily disposed to acknowledge 
the actuality of such things as the ‘silent’ ‘internal’ recitation of lists, music and 
poems, the having of dreams and so forth. It is, then, possible that, on some 
occasions, KL’s and other members’ uses of mental state/process descriptions 
(whatever other work such a reporting might also be doing — offering a second 
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story, attending to matters of identity management, or whatever) may sensibly 
be taken as such, thus avoiding the antithetical (but, for all that, equally 
absolutist) positions espoused by both cognitivism and Coulterism. 
 For it would be pointless to deny that, in ordinary everyday life, people 
imagine, dream, see things ‘in the mind’s eye’, picture landscapes to 
themselves, silently recite shopping lists to themselves, and so on. This in no 
way warrants the ghost-in-the-machine or ‘double-life’ view that there is always 
some ‘mental event’ vaguely akin to these at the basis of all overt human 
actions. As Ryle puts it: we may “come to suppose that there is a special 
mystery about how we publish our thoughts instead of realising that we 
employ a special artifice to keep them to ourselves” (1949: 27). Still less does 
this Rylean concession to ‘internal thoughts’ warrant the view that the meanings 
of such words as ‘think’, ‘know’, ‘understand’, ‘believe’, etc. are given by 
reference to internal (‘mental’) states or events. 
 For all this, there appear to be perfectly ordinary but quite context-specific 
situations where our public talk (or writing) can make reference to imaginings, 
mental calculations, silent soliloquies, and the rest. Such practices can be 
undertaken. And so, unsurprisingly, references can be made to them. Indeed 
Wittgenstein and Ryle, themselves, constantly refer to them (see, for example, 
Ryle, 1949: 35-40) — and we have just done so here without, we hope, 
controversy. (Mumblings from what remains of behaviourism-proper 
notwithstanding.) In some circumstances — especially professional-
psychological ones — we might reasonably infer that the use of such mental 
predicates commits the speaker to a ghost-in-the-machine position such as 
cognitivism. In other circumstances, we may not. Other criteria may underpin 
their use. When, for example, James Taylor sings “In my mind I’m gone to 
Carolina” (Taylor, 1971: 108), we do not attribute a kind of folk-cognitivism to 
him, or point to his terrible grammar. We would not say that he writes and 
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sings ‘as if’ Descartes’ mind-body hypothesis had been confirmed. Nor do we 
assume he has an extremely large piece of American real estate between his 
ears. Perhaps, instead, we appreciate the assonance of the mind’s ‘i’. 
 Such cultural objects and practices (in this case, a line from a song) can turn 
out to be just ordinary talk (or song, or writing) designed for particular 
purposes and effects, and we should not jump from them to the extraordinary 
conclusion that they are misguided (Coulter, 1999) or that members talking in 
such ways are talking ‘as if’ their words referred to occult processes, ‘as if’ they 
were folk-cognitivists (Bilmes, 1992). We are thus in the paradoxical position 
that both post-Wittgensteinian scholarship — which is of course (and rightly) 
critical of the slipshod theorising of cognitive psychology — and cognitive 
psychology itself, find themselves to be a companion pair: sharing in their 
ironic stance towards everyday members’ usages. For both Coulter and for the 
cognitivists he criticises, ordinary members not only cannot know that on 
which they report but also, in their reportings, they are lamentably (and 
accountably) in error. They are cast, it would seem, as either grammatical or 
psychological dopes. Either conclusion, reconditely philosophical or ‘scientific’ 
as it may be, is both condescending and ironic towards members’ routine 
practices in the sense criticised by Garfinkel and Sacks (1970). 
 The impulse or motive for such a judgment may be a peculiar kind of 
eliminativism in its own right. What we have in mind here is, for example, 
Ryle’s dictate: “The phrase ‘in the mind’ can and should always be dispensed 
with” (1949: 40). But such a position risks securing one’s Rylean moorings at 
the risk of losing one’s fundamental ethnomethodological grounds. And so, 
ending very much where we began, we note that Sacks, for one, has stated 
those grounds contrastively with analytic-theoretical attempts to correct 
ethnomethodology’s central object of description: what members know and use: 
A curious fact becomes apparent if you look at the first paragraph — it 
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may occur in the third paragraph — of the reportedly revolutionary 
scientific treatises back to the pre-Socratics and ending up to at least 
Freud. You find that they all begin by saying something like this, 
“About the thing I’m going to talk about, people think they know, but 
they don’t. Furthermore, if you tell them, it doesn’t change anything. 
They still walk around like they know although they are walking in a 
dreamworld”. Darwin begins this way. Freud begins in a similar way. 
Bloomfield’s analysis of language begins in a similar way, and I could 
provide a much larger list. What we are interested in is, what is it that people 
seem to know and use? Here what people know and use is not to be 
mapped for each area on to what it is that science turns out to know, but 
is to be investigated itself. How does “what people know and use” 
work? How could it be enforced? What are its properties? It seems to be 
referred to as ‘time, place, etc’. The problem is that, since each major 
treatise that has set up scientific fields starts out by saying that what 
people know and use is wrong, obviously it would not be a way to find 
out about what people know and use by considering ‘science’ proposals. 
Instead what we want to do is see if we can look at the enforceable and 
usable procedures for whatever knowledge persons happen to have 
(Sacks in Hill and Crittenden, 1968: 13; our emphasis). 
So if Sigmund — or anyone of that ilk — calls, tell them it didn’t work. 
Ψ terms / page 21 
 
Notes 
 
i. Intriguingly Boyle’s (2002) work has elegantly demonstrated the 
intellectual incoherence of the misappropriation by psychology itself of 
describably ‘specialist’ terminology such as ‘diagnosis’ and ‘syndrome’. See 
also Sarbin and Mancuso (1984) and Soyland (1994). 
ii.  This need not in any way imply a commitment to the cognitivist notion 
that ‘projected talk’ entails the speaker ‘having in their head’ a script of the talk 
to come, ready and waiting for the vocal apparatus to deliver the mind’s 
cognitive contents into public space. 
iii. The awkwardness of the expression “actually experienced a mental event” 
highlights our central problem. That is, it is almost impossible to describe 
putative events, states, experiences, etc., going on ‘in the head’, ‘behind’ a 
given utterance, without breaching the logical grammar of our ordinary 
language. This may, in part, account for the introduction of specialist 
expressions into (philosophical and ‘scientific’) psychology such as Fodor’s 
(1983; 1987; 1990) “(mental) representations”, “mentalese”, “broad vs. narrow 
(mental) contents”, “(mental) tokening” and the rest. On the logical-
grammatical problems of such expressions, see Button, et al. (1991: 53-109). 
iv. This is not to say that Sacks doubts the existence (as do some 
behaviourists) of ‘real’ mental processes. See, for example, his pass through the 
distinction between “abstract” and “concrete” thinking (1992a: 109-110); his 
remarks on “memory” (1992a: 759-760); or his lecture on dreams (1992b: 512-
518). Indeed, we have just seen Sacks working directly with “the thoughts, 
remembrances, wonderings and the like that persons engaged in topical talk 
have” (1970: 46, our emphasis). 
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v. In classical sociology, the case is made in somewhat stronger terms. 
Durkheim (1938: 103-104), for example, writes: “... in the case of psychology 
and sociology, the same break in continuity [applies] as between biology and 
the physico-chemical sciences. Accordingly, whenever a social phenomenon is 
directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, one may be sure that the 
explanation is false”. 
vi. An earlier draft of this discussion can be found in Miller and McHoul 
(1998: 124-126). 
vii. This question was prompted by the following remark made by one of the 
anonymous reviewers of an earlier draft of the present paper: 
One problem with the Coulter-Wittgenstein line on beetles in boxes, and 
reference to internal mental states, is the notion that despite what a 
pragmatic analysis can show, people may actually consider themselves 
to be referring to internal mental states ... and, more importantly, talk as 
if that were so. Rather than telling people they are wrong, I think the 
thing to do is to examine, within an empirical and pragmatic analysis, 
how the ‘internal mental states’ aspect of psychological terms may 
actually figure in how they are used, rather than [being] something that 
people can’t ‘really’ do. 
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